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FINDING A COUNTRY TO CALL HOME: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING LEGISLATION TO 
REDUCE STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Alec Paxton† 
Abstract: Statelessness is a problem that affects 12 million people worldwide, 
with severe social, economic, and political consequences.  This problem is particularly 
acute in Southeast Asia.  Over the last sixty years, Southeast Asian states have attempted 
to reduce existing stateless populations through nationalization.  These attempts have 
been met with varying degrees of success.  The United Nations High Commission on 
Refugees and other non-governmental organizations have recently started to evaluate the 
outcome of these legislative attempts to reduce statelessness.  These ad hoc evaluations 
provide valuable lessons for those who are drafting legislation to reduce existing stateless 
populations as well as legal scholars evaluating their efforts.  Drawing from the 
experience of Southeast Asian states, this comment gives specific recommendations for 
evaluating and informing legislation designed to reduce existing stateless populations in 
Southeast Asian states through nationalization.  This comment suggests that legislation 
should relax and tailor documentation requirements for naturalization, reduce fees and 
administrative burdens to naturalization, reduce residency requirements, unconditionally 
naturalize those born in the state, and waive language and knowledge requirements.  
Legislation aimed at reducing statelessness should incorporate principles of 
nondiscrimination and safeguards against arbitrary denials of citizenship.  Additionally, 
states should engage in awareness campaigns that target stateless persons after enacting 
the legislation.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) 
estimates that there are 12 million stateless people worldwide. 1   This 
problem is particularly acute in the Southeast Asian countries of Cambodia, 
Thailand, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam. 2   These stateless 
                                                 
†
  Juris Doctor expected in 2013, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their guidance in developing this 
comment.  The author invites thoughts and criticisms on the content of this comment and is available at 
apaxton@uw.edu.  
1
  Reliable estimates of stateless populations have only been gathered in sixty countries and have 
shown an estimated 6.6 million people.  However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) has estimated that there are 12 million stateless people worldwide.  See UNHCR, 2009 
GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS 
PERSONS 1 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html.  Some estimates place this number 
as high as 15 million.  See, e.g., Q&A: The World’s 15 Million Stateless People Need Help, UNHCR, May 
18, 2007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/464dca3c4.html. 
2
  UNHCR, REGIONAL EXPERT ROUND TABLE ON GOOD PRACTICES FOR THE IDENTIFICATION, 
PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS AND THE PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS IN SOUTH 
EAST ASIA 2 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6e09932.html [hereinafter 
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE].  See also KATHERINE SOUTHWICK & M. LYNCH, NATIONALITY RIGHTS 
FOR ALL: A PROGRESS REPORT AND GLOBAL SURVEY ON STATELESSNESS 1 (2009), available at 
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populations exist at the fringe of society as legal ghosts and are among the 
world’s most vulnerable people. 3   Stateless people lack effective 
nationality,4 and thus cannot avail themselves of the legal protections of any 
state. 5   Stateless populations in Southeast Asia suffer severe economic, 
political, and social hardships and are at a heightened risk for trafficking.6  
Their plight is made more precarious because, until recently, the 
international community knew very little about the size, location, or 
circumstances facing stateless persons residing in developing countries.7  As 
a result, they have received substantially less international assistance as 
compared to refugees and internally displaced persons.8 
 While the international community overlooked stateless populations 
in developing countries, Southeast Asian states enacted legislation to address 
the complex issues presented by these populations.  In 2004, the 
international community began to recognize the subtle but devastating 
consequences of protracted stateless situations.9  Legal experts at leading 
international development organizations, in collaboration with UNHCR, 
have started to evaluate the effectiveness of these individual pieces of 
legislation and trends have begun to emerge.   
 This comment examines those trends and identifies factors that have 
proven to be important to the success of legislation designed to reduce 
statelessness in Southeast Asian states.  It evaluates the outcomes of 
legislation enacted by Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam in order to craft a framework for drafting and evaluating legislation 
                                                                                                                                                
http://reliefweb.int/node/300917 (discussing Thailand as a country with one of the highest stateless 
populations worldwide).   
3
  Nicole Green & Todd Pierce, Combatting Statelessness: A Government Perspective, 32 FMR 35 
(2009), available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/34-35.pdf. 
4
  The terms “nationality” and “citizenship” will be used interchangeably in this comment to refer to 
formal, legal membership of a state.  The author acknowledges that there are differences between these 
terms; however, these differences do not affect the analysis contained in this comment. 
5
  LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 
(2008); UNHCR, HELPING THE WORLD’S STATELESS PEOPLE 2 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/r
efworld/docid/4e55e7dd2.html [hereinafter HELPING THE WORLD’S STATELESS PEOPLE].  
6
  UNHCR, GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 3 (2010), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6e0a792.html [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING 
STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA]; SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 3; VITAL VOICES, STATELESS 
AND VULNERABLE TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THAILAND 3 (2007), available at http://www.humantraffick
ing.org/uploads/publications/Vital_Voices_Stateless_and_Vulnerable_to_Human_Trafficking_in_Thailand
.pdf (examining the situation of stateless people in Thailand). 
7
  See, e.g., SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 2. 
8
  HELPING THE WORLD’S STATELESS PEOPLE, supra note 5, at 2 (2011). 
9
  See, e.g., UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 166 para. bb (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworl
d/docid/4b28bf1f2.html (representing the first time the UNHCR called for protracted statelessness to be 
addressed specifically). 
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to reduce statelessness.  The resulting framework functions as an evaluation 
tool for legal scholars as well as a set of recommendations to 
parliamentarians. 
 Part II of this comment defines statelessness and examines its causes 
and consequences.  Part III advances the argument that existing international 
instruments provide insufficient guidance on reducing statelessness.  Part IV 
argues that legislative attempts to reduce statelessness can be effective and 
presents a framework for evaluating and drafting national legislation 
designed to reduce statelessness, building upon lessons advanced by 
practitioners and scholars.  The framework recommends the specific 
legislative provisions, administrative protections, and awareness-raising 
activities that have proven critical to the success of legislation in Southeast 
Asian states.  
 There are two important limitations of this framework.  First, it 
pertains exclusively to legislation designed to reduce statelessness through 
nationalization.10   It does not profess to address legislation designed to  
protect or prevent future cases of statelessness.  Second, this framework is 
necessarily incomplete.  Reliable data and reports on the outcomes of 
legislation designed to reduce statelessness are limited and evolving.  This 
framework is only intended to summarize the lessons that can be teased from 
this emerging area of study.  Instead of providing the final word on the 
subject, this comment hopes to begin the conversation and encourage 
additional scholarly debate on reducing existing cases of statelessness in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
II. COMPETING DEFINITIONS AND MULTIPLE CAUSES OF STATELESSNESS 
LEAD TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES  
 
 Statelessness is caused by a variety of defects in national and 
international law.  These include conflicts of law, inadequate administrative 
infrastructure, state succession, migration, laws that particularly affect 
women, and discrimination.  Because legislation to reduce statelessness will 
need to cure these defects, this section outlines the causes of statelessness 
that pose major obstacles to creating successful legislation.  Keep in mind 
that this section presents broad issues that face multiple countries in varied 
contexts, but as this comment later suggests, has strong implications for 
Southeast Asian states. 
                                                 
10
  The terms “naturalization” and “nationalization” are used interchangeably in this comment to refer 
to the process by which a state recognizes an individual as a citizen of that state. 
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A.  Definitions: De Jure and De Facto Statelessness  
 
There are two types of statelessness:  de jure and de facto.  
Historically, states have had the absolute right to define who is a citizen of 
their state,11 and those who fall through the cracks in this mesh of citizenship 
laws are labeled de jure stateless.12  According to Article 1 of the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (“1954 Convention”), 
a person is de jure stateless if that person is “not considered as a national by 
any [s]tate under the operation of its law.”13  In other words, a person is 
stateless if he or she is not recognized as a citizen of any state.  
De facto statelessness, in contrast to de jure statelessness, eludes such 
precise definition,14 and international law has not clarified the issue.  The 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (“1961 Convention”), in 
its final act, makes reference to “persons who are stateless de facto,” noting 
that they should be treated as stateless de jure to the extent possible.15  
However, the 1961 Convention does not define the term de facto.  The final 
act of the 1954 Convention likewise alludes to individuals who do not fall 
within the Convention’s definition of statelessness, but are nonetheless 
similarly situated, making reference to a “person [who] has renounced the 
protection of the State of which he is a national.” 16  Beyond this, however, 
reference to de facto stateless persons is absent from international legal 
instruments. 
 So how do we define de facto statelessness?  It has traditionally been 
couched in terms of ineffective nationality.17  These individuals are citizens 
of a state, or possess a legally meritorious claim to citizenship, but are 
                                                 
11
  For instance, the International Court of Justice held in the Nottebohm Case that “. . . it is for every 
sovereign [s]tate to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality.”  
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 20 (Apr. 6, 1955).  See also VAN 
WAAS,  supra note 5, at 93; ASBJORN EIDE, CITIZENSHIP AND THE MINORITY RIGHTS OF NONCITIZENS 5, 
para. 19 (1999).  
12
 David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245, 
251 (2006). 
13
  Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 
(entered into force June 6, 1960) [hereinafter 1954 Convention].  
14
  For a good discussion of the difficulties with defining de facto statelessness, see Allison Harvey, 
Statelessness: The ‘de facto’ Statelessness Debate, 24 J. IANL 257 (2010). 
15
  Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175, 279, [hereinafter 
1961 Convention] (with Final Act of the U.N. Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future 
Statelessness, held at Geneva from March 24 to April 18 1959, and Resolution I, II, III and IV of the 
Conference).   
16
  Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless Persons, July 1951, 360 
U.N.T.S. 117, 122 [hereinafter Final Act of 1951 Convention].   
17
  See, e.g., UNHCR, THE CONCEPT OF STATELESS PERSONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2010), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ca1ae002.html.  
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unable or, for valid reasons, unwilling to avail themselves of the protections 
of that state.18  A de facto stateless person might not avail themselves of the 
state’s protection because of ongoing civil disorder, fear of persecution, or 
practical considerations such as cost.19  De facto stateless persons include 
those who have a nationality but do not enjoy the rights of their nationality, 
those who are unable to document their nationality, and those who, as a 
result of state succession, habitually reside in a state other than their state of 
citizenship.20 
 In short, a de jure stateless person lacks a legal nationality and a 
de facto stateless person lacks meaningful nationality.  International 
instruments define de jure statelessness explicitly, but have not precisely 
defined de facto statelessness.  In many respects, this distinction is merely 
academic; both groups face the same social, economic, and political 
consequences as a result of their statelessness.21 
B. Multiple Causes of Statelessness Pose Obstacles to National and 
Regional Legislation 
 Statelessness occurs for a variety of diverse reasons, ranging from 
state succession to insufficient administrative infrastructure.  Statelessness 
results from inadvertent oversight as well as deliberate state action.  In order 
to craft a solution that corrects the devastating effects of statelessness, it is 
critical to understand how statelessness occurs.  This section explores nine 
major causes of statelessness. 
1.  Inconsistency Between Nationality Laws Gives Rise to Statelessness 
 Many individuals fall through the cracks created by a patchwork of 
mismatched nationality laws.  A person is often rendered stateless when the 
national legislation of two countries differs such that the individual is left 
without a legal claim to citizenship in either country. 22   For instance, 
suppose a person is born in State A, which only recognizes citizenship by 
descent (jus sanguinis), but whose parents are citizens of State B, which 
                                                 
18
  Id.; see also Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75, 82 (2011). 
19
  Milbrandt, supra note 18, at 82.  UNHCR also has defined a de facto stateless person as one who 
is “unable to demonstrate that he/she is de jure stateless, yet he/she has no effective nationality and does 
not enjoy national protection.”  See UNHCR, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
PARLIAMENTARIANS 11 (2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/436608b24.html 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS]. 
20
  Milbrandt, supra note 18, at 82. 
21
 See infra Part II.C. 
22
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 27. 
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only recognizes citizenship by place of birth (jus soli).23  In this example, the 
child would have no claim to citizenship in State A because his or her 
parents are nationals of State B.  The child would also not have claim to 
citizenship in State B because she was born in State A.  The individual is 
rendered stateless because of the mismatched nationality laws of State A and 
State B.  The risk that conflicting laws will result in statelessness is 
magnified by the fact that nationality laws are extremely complicated and 
they often confront equally complicated, but inconsistent, laws of a second 
state.24 
 More subtle conflicts between nationality laws also result in 
statelessness.  For instance, statelessness may also occur when a state’s 
nationality law requires a citizen to renounce his or her citizenship before 
acquiring, or being guaranteed to acquire, a second nationality.25  This often 
occurs when nationality laws fail to take into account the potential for 
statelessness when a marriage dissolves while in the nationalization process.  
In Vietnam, for example, many women were rendered stateless after they 
married foreigners and were required to renounce their Vietnamese 
citizenship prior to obtaining citizenship in their spouse’s country.26  Many 
of these marriages dissolved before they were able to secure citizenship in 
their spouse’s country—leaving thousands stateless.27 
2. Administrative Obstacles Create Barriers to Citizenship 
 People may become stateless because they cannot navigate, access, or 
afford the burdensome administrative processes to obtaining citizenship.  
Excessive fees, narrow deadlines, and demanding documentation 
requirements create real obstacles to citizenship.28   
 Additionally, poorly functioning birth registration systems have left 
many without any evidence of their place of birth or parentage.29  Many lack 
                                                 
23
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 50. 
24
  See William Samore, Statelessness as a Consequence of the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 45 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 476, 477 (1951).  
25
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 28; GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING 
STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 4. 
26
  Statelessness occurs most commonly following the dissolution of marriages between Vietnamese 
women and men from Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, or Singapore.  Kitty McKinsey, Divorce leaves 
some Vietnamese women broken-hearted and stateless, Feb. 14, 2007, UNHCR, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/45d324428.html; see also GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 10. 
27
  McKinsey, supra note 26. 
28
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 32-33.  See also infra Part IV.A.2.b, which 
discusses this problem in more depth.  
29
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 12. 
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meaningful access to birth registration systems, which make it impossible to 
provide the documents needed to prove citizenship.30  Many children are 
rendered stateless even though they were born in the “right” state or to the 
“right” parents.31  These obstacles to registration are sometimes the result of 
targeted attacks on specific populations, and other times result from 
ineffective state infrastructure.32  
 The interplay between birth registration systems and statelessness is 
hard to understate.  Every year an estimated 40 million births go 
unregistered.33  A child who is not registered lacks the “official and visible 
evidence of a state’s legal recognition of his or her existence as a member of 
society.”34 
 Cambodia is a prime example of how governments, in conjunction 
with local communities, can overcome these administrative burdens if they 
are committed to doing so.  Before 2000, less than 5% of Cambodia’s 
population  held  birth  registration  certificates. 35   However, in 2000, 
Cambodia committed to resolve the situation and by 2005 it had registered 
91% of the population.36  Local community leaders, monks, and teachers 
played  a  vital role in  building  trust  and  explaining  the  importance    of 
birth registration to stateless communities throughout Cambodia. 37  
Nongovernmental organizations helped plan the campaign, which also 
contributed to its success.38 
3. Laws That Automatically Revoke Citizenship Cause Statelessness 
 Some states revoke citizenship if an individual resides abroad for a 
certain period of time.  The amount of time varies between states from a few 
months39 to many years,40 and revocation can affect both natural-born and 
                                                 
30
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 31. 
31
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 153. 
32
  REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, FORCED MIGRATION POLICY BRIEFING 3: STATELESSNESS, 
PROTECTION AND EQUALITY 14-15 (2009), available at http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policy-
briefings/RSCPB3-Statelessness.pdf/view; REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 3. 
33
  UNICEF, Deficient Birth Registration in Developing Countries, 24 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 
659, 662 (1998). 
34
  NICOLA SHARP, UNIVERSAL BIRTH REGISTRATION—A UNIVERSAL RESPONSIBILITY 11 (2005), 
available at http://plan-international.org/birthregistration/files/ubr-launch-report-english.  
35
  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LEGAL IDENTITY FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT 79 (2007), available 
at http://www.adb.org/publications/legal-identity-inclusive-development. 
36
  Id. at 76. 
37
  Id. at 56-57; GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, 
at 20. 
38
  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 35, at 76. 
39
 VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 33; HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 33. 
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naturalized citizens.41  Often, home countries do not notify individuals that 
they risk losing their citizenship when moving abroad.42  In addition to laws 
that revoke citizenship based on time spent away from the state, citizenship 
can be automatically revoked when an individual behaves in a way 
inconsistent with their loyalty to the state, such as pledging a formal oath of 
allegiance to a foreign state or voluntarily serving in the armed forces of a 
foreign state.43 
In Burma, for example, the Burmese military junta rendered as many 
as 2 million former Burmese citizens stateless after they fled Burma for 
Thailand.44  Burma’s citizenship law provides that any citizen leaving the 
country permanently ceases to be a citizen45 and reports indicate that the 
Burmese government deemed individuals who left without government 
approval to have left the country permanently—stripping them of their 
citizenship. 46   These revocations are permanent, worsening the problem.  
Article 22 of Burma’s Citizenship Law prevents former citizens from 
reapplying for citizenship.47  
4. State Succession or Dissolution Causes Statelessness 
 Historically, the dissolution of states and the transfer of territory from 
one state to another have been major causes of statelessness.48  This occurs 
when a state dissolves, when a colony becomes independent, or when a 
successor state wholly or partially succeeds a predecessor state.49  During the 
transition, individuals are sometimes overlooked or affirmatively rejected as 
part of the successor state, resulting in statelessness.50 
 
                                                                                                                                                
40
  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 9 (2010) 
(referencing Indonesia). 
41
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 41. 
42
  Id. at 33. 
43
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 79. 
44
  Id. at 168. 
45
  Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982 [Burma Citizenship Law] (promulgated by the Chairman of the 
Council of State, published Oct. 16, 1982) para. 16 (Myan.) [hereinafter Burma Citizenship Law]. 
46
  Nyo Nyo, Burmese Children in Thailand: Legal Aspects, 10 LEGAL ISSUES ON BURMA 51, 54 
(2001). 
47
  Burma Citizenship Law, para. 22 (Myan.). 
48
  Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 12, at 261.  Much has been written on state succession as a 
cause of statelessness.  For further discussion on this topic, see Special Rapporteur Vaclav Mikulka, First 
Report on State Succession and its Impact on the Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/467 (Apr. 17, 1995).  
49
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 34; VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 123. 
50
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 123. 
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5.  Arbitrary and Discriminatory Denial of Citizenship Results in 
Statelessness 
 Statelessness often results when a state arbitrarily and discriminatorily 
denies or revokes an individual’s citizenship.  This generally occurs when 
citizenship is withheld or revoked based on an arbitrary consideration such 
as ethnicity.51  While international law has substantially curtailed a state’s 
right to deny citizenship on arbitrary grounds, states have nonetheless 
continued to deny citizenship arbitrarily, resulting in statelessness.52  This 
discrimination is not limited to explicit provisions of national legislation, but 
also occurs at the administrative level when the required documents are 
inaccessible to stateless persons or when there is no meaningful avenue for 
appeal.53 
 Some national legislation explicitly forecloses the possibility of 
becoming a citizen if the individual belongs to a certain ethnic group.54  
Statelessness may also occur when facially neutral laws are applied in a 
discriminatory manner 55 or when a state unjustifiably places onerous 
administrative fees or obligations on some, but not all, individuals.56  
6.  State Withdrawal of Citizenship Causes Statelessness 
 Many states have withdrawn the citizenship of large groups of 
minorities in a single act.57  This is a particularly devastating variation on the 
arbitrary and discriminatory revocation of citizenship 58  that historically 
occurs during times of political restructuring or periods of influential and 
exclusive nationalist ideologies.59  It occurred after the First World War in 
Western Europe, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, and more recently with 
                                                 
51
  Id. at 97. 
52
  Id. at 36, 95; see also REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing post-
colonial Burma, hill tribes in Thailand, ethnic Chinese in Brunei, and ethnic minorities in Cambodia). 
53
  Gay McDougall, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the independent expert on 
minority issues, para. 27, Feb. 28, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/23; see also OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 5 (2004). 
54
  For instance, Burma’s citizenship law identifies certain ethnic groups who are granted citizenship 
automatically, and provides the Council of State the right to “decide whether any ethnic group is a national 
or not.”  Burma Citizenship Law, para. 4 (Myan.). 
55
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 113. 
56
  See, e.g., REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing post-colonial Burma, 
hill tribes in Thailand, ethnic Chinese in Brunei, and ethnic minorities in Cambodia). 
57
  REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 10. 
58
  See supra Part II.B.5. 
59
  REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 10. 
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ethnic Nepalese communities in Bhutan and non-Arab populations in 
Mauritania.60  
7.  Laws Affecting Women Result in Statelessness  
 Laws that adversely affect women are one of the leading causes of 
statelessness worldwide.61  These laws can take a variety of forms.  In some 
cases, a woman may lose her citizenship upon marrying a man from a 
foreign state and become stateless if she does not automatically become a 
citizen of her husband’s state, or after the marriage dissolves. 62   The 
dissolution of a marriage may render either partner stateless, but historically 
it has disproportionately affected women.63  In other cases, a woman is 
barred from passing her nationality onto her children.64   This creates a 
problem when the child is born out of wedlock, the husband denies 
parentage, the husband has no nationality, or the husband refuses to 
legitimize the child.65 
8.  Transnational Migration Often Results in Statelessness 
 Migrants comprise approximately 3% of the global population. 66  
Individuals or entire populations are at risk of statelessness when they 
voluntarily migrate, are expelled from their home states, or flee one state to 
another.  Legal, social, and linguistic barriers keep many migrants from 
accessing resources that are critical to preventing their children from 
becoming stateless, particularly when they are unable to access birth 
registration systems.67  The children of migrants are often unable to prove 
parentage and place of birth, particularly in irregular migrant populations 
                                                 
60
  Id. at 10, 12; SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 2-3, 41. 
61
  U.S. Sec’y of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Ministerial on the 60th Anniversary of the Refugee Convention, Dec. 7, 2011, U.N. Doc. PRN 
2011/T57-18.  
62
  See supra Part II.B.1; see also HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 33; VAN 
WAAS, supra note 5, at 64 (conflict of law), 71 (divorce). 
63
  Lung-chu Chen, Equal Protection of Women in Reference to Nationality and Freedom of 
Movement, 69 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 18, 19 (1975). 
64
  REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 14; GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 10. 
65
   HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 32. 
66
  U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs Population Division, International Migration Report 2009: A 
Global Assessment, xviii, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/316 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.un.org/esa/
population/publications/migration/WorldMigrationReport2009.pdf. 
67
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 164. 
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that lack access to the formal legal mechanisms that are required to become 
eligible for citizenship.68   
 Three categories of migrants suffer statelessness more than others. 
First, migrants who lose their citizenship because they migrated to a new 
state without first attaining citizenship elsewhere are at particular risk of 
statelessness.69  Second, children of migrants who reside in countries that 
link citizenship solely to parentage are at particular risk for statelessness 
because they do not have the requisite parentage. 70   Third, children of 
migrants in states with poorly functioning birth registration systems are at 
particular risk because, as discussed above, it is unlikely that their new home 
state will have a record of their birth and they will be unable to sufficiently 
document their claim to citizenship.71 
9. Abandoned and Orphaned Children are Often Stateless 
 Children that are abandoned for political, social, or economic reasons 
and orphans without documented parentage are often rendered stateless.72  It 
is difficult to establish the identity of these children because often nothing is 
known about their place of birth nor about their parents’ nationality.73  This 
cause of statelessness is not insignificant; UNHCR has reported finding 
thousands of stateless children in orphanages.74  
C. The Combined Consequences of Statelessness Prevent Individuals 
from Exercising Their Basic Human Rights 
The consequences of statelessness are incredibly severe and they 
pervade every aspect of a stateless person’s life.  In Thailand, for instance, 
stateless individuals cannot own real property, they face detention for their 
status as stateless, and they are unable to access basic social services such as 
                                                 
68
  Id. at 165. 
69
  An individual can be rendered stateless simply by migrating to a new state if the laws of the 
migrant’s state automatically revoke citizenship after a citizen has been absent from the country for a 
predetermined period of time.  See supra Part II.B.3.  This is a particularly risky situation for irregular 
immigrants because their presence is undocumented and they are unable to qualify as being “lawfully 
present” for the purposes of the naturalization laws of the state—a prerequisite for naturalizing in every 
state.  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 168 (discussing the situation of 2 million stateless, irregular Burmese 
migrants residing in Thailand). 
70
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 168.  
71
  Id. at 169 (noting that this is particularly true for irregular immigrants). 
72
  Id. at 68-69.  
73
  Id. at 69. 
74
  CAROL BATCHELOR, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK CONCERNING STATELESSNESS AND 
ACCESS FOR STATELESS PERSONS 2-3 para. 4 (2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/415 
c3be44.html (E.U. Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection). 
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education and healthcare.75  The severity of these consequences can be offset 
in states that guarantee certain rights to stateless individuals.76  However, no 
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) has 
procedures for designating an individual as stateless. 77   Instead, the 
protection of stateless individuals is, under the best of circumstances, dealt 
with on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.78  This approach threatens stateless 
individuals’ civil and political rights. 
1.  Statelessness Undermines Individuals’ Social and Economic Rights 
 The social costs of statelessness are severe.  In most Southeast Asian 
countries, secondary education is not accessible without proof of 
citizenship.79  Even when education is provided, the surrounding economic 
and social pressures prevent stateless children from attending school. 80  
These individuals are often unable to access, or unable to afford, basic health 
care services.81  In many states, the right to marry is linked to citizenship.82 
 Stateless individuals in Southeast Asia face severe economic 
insecurity.  In many places, they are precluded from seeking traditional 
employment83 or owning property.84  When they are successful in accessing 
traditional employment, they often encounter “poor working conditions, 
including difficult, dangerous, and dirty jobs; verbal abuse; violence; racism; 
discriminatory attitudes; cramped living conditions; intimidating workplace 
                                                 
75
  VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 11. 
76
  See, e.g., REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 17-18. 
77
 REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that no ASEAN nations have 
stateless determination procedures nor do they recognize stateless persons, but only refugee status); see 
also infra Part III.A (discussing protections for stateless people embodied in the 1954 Convention).  
ASEAN is comprised of the following states:  Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos.  ASEAN 
Member States, ASEANWEB, available at http://www.aseansec.org/18619.htm. 
78
 REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 25.  
79
  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 3.  This, 
however, appears to be one problem that is being addressed.  Thailand recently passed legislation to 
provide free secondary education.  THAI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATION FOR ALL, 
§ 2.3 (2000), available at http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/thailand/rapport_1.html.  
Malaysia has also recently recognized the importance of education for stateless populations residing in the 
country, and the modest cost of providing this education.  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 23. 
80
  In Thailand for instance, a recent UNHCR study found stateless youth are 73% less likely to enter 
primary school and 98% less likely to progress to higher education.  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING 
STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 7. 
81
  REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 6. 
82
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 12. 
83
  See M. LYNCH, LIVES ON HOLD: THE HUMAN COST OF STATELESSNESS 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/lives-hold-human-cost-statelessness; 
ELIZABETH FERRIS, THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION: THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 53 (2011).  
84
  Id. 
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environments; and low salaries (which are often withheld).”85  Additionally, 
stateless individuals typically lack access to formal credit markets and are 
unable to open bank accounts.86  The cumulative effect of these hardships 
produces economic insecurity and an environment ripe for exploitation.  In 
Malaysia, for example, the inaccessibility of traditional employment forces 
some stateless individuals to resort to criminal activities, begging, and 
prostitution.87  
 The combined effect of these structural vulnerabilities put stateless 
people at particular risk for trafficking.  This connection has been especially 
well documented in Thailand.88  There, stateless ethnic minority populations 
lack access to formal employment opportunities outside of their villages 
because noncitizens have restricted travel passes that only allow for short 
stays away from their villages.89  They also cannot own land90 and do not 
have access to state-subsidized health care.91  The movement of noncitizens 
is greatly restricted, which worsens their economic position, forces them to 
make difficult and dangerous decisions,92 and prevents them from reaching 
out to the authorities for assistance once trafficked.93   
2.  Statelessness Threatens Individuals’ Basic Civil and Political Rights 
 Stateless individuals lack a voice in a state’s political dialogue, which 
further marginalizes their position.  Without citizenship, a person cannot 
assert his or her basic civil and political rights.94   Stateless populations 
cannot stand for election, nor can they vote.95  In Southeast Asia, stateless 
individuals also face unwarranted detention and arrest by authorities because 
the laws there are ill-equipped to deal with the needs of stateless 
                                                 
85
  U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Prevention of Discrimination: The Rights of Noncitizens, para. 11, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23/Add.3 (May 26, 2003) [hereinafter UNCHR] (in 2006 the UNCHR was 
replaced by the U.N. Human Rights Council).  
86
  SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 3. 
87
  REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 29 n.189. 
88
  See generally David Feingold, UNESCO Promotes Highland Citizenship and Birth Registration to 
Prevent Human Trafficking, UNESCO BANGKOK NEWSLETTER ISSUE 8, Sept. 2006, at 5, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001556/155635e.pdf; see also VITAL VOICES, supra note 6.  
89
  VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 12. 
90
  Thailand, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 8, 2006), available at 
 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61628.htm. 
91
  As non-citizens, stateless individual cannot benefit from the “30-baht plan” and other public health 
services available to Thai citizens.  KAREN LEITER & CHRIS BREYER, NO STATUS: MIGRATION, 
TRAFFICKING, AND EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN IN THAILAND 2, 45, June 2004, available at 
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/no-status-women-in-thailand-2004.html. 
92
  VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 12.  
93
  Id. at 14. 
94
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 3. 
95
  Id. 
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populations.96  The increased likelihood of arrest coupled with the lack of 
voting rights makes it difficult for stateless populations to stage 
demonstrations and protests—their only remaining political rights.97 
 Stateless populations also remain at risk of displacement and mass 
expulsion.98  This most often occurs when nationality has been arbitrarily 
stripped for a discriminatory reason, such as ethnicity. 99  The consequences 
of displacement are severe.  It deprives people of the essentials of life, 
including food, shelter, community, education, and a resource base for self-
reliance.100 
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROTECT AGAINST AND PREVENT 
STATELESSNESS, BUT DOMESTIC LEGISLATION ALSO HAS THE POWER 
TO REDUCE INSTANCES OF STATELESSNESS 
  International law, most notably Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, clearly establishes an individual’s “right to a 
nationality.” 101   Despite recognizing this right, subsequent international 
agreements have aimed to protect existing stateless populations and prevent 
future cases of statelessness instead of working to reduce current instances 
of statelessness.  International instruments are largely silent on the how and 
when to reduce existing cases of statelessness, and they provide little 
guidance in the subject.  Despite the international community’s silence, 
many Southeast Asian states have experimented with legislation to reduce 
statelessness, some with considerable success. 
                                                 
96
  Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 12, at 267-68.  
97
  For an example of this occurring in South Asia, see Paula Banerjee, Women, Trafficking, and 
Statelessness in South Asia, 27 REFUGEE WATCH CATALOGUE 42, 42-51, June 2006, available at 
http://www.mcrg.ac.in/cata.htm.  
98
  REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 1; REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, 
at 16. 
99
  McDougall, supra note 53, para. 24. 
100
  Francis M. Deng, Divided Nation: The Paradox of National Protection, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2006).  
101
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15(1), Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71.  The 
right to a nationality has also been posited for particularly at-risk groups of individuals in subsequent 
international conventions.  See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
art. 5, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, ensuring racially and ethnically 
neutral enjoyment of the right to a nationality); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 24, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (stating, “[e]very child has the right to a nationality”); The Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, requiring that women have an equal right to a nationality as men). 
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A. While Calling for a Reduction in Statelessness, the 1954 and 1961 
Conventions Do Not Provide Adequate Direction on Reducing 
Existing Cases of Statelessness 
 The 1954 Convention develops protective measures to safeguard the 
rights of stateless persons.102  The primary purpose of the 1954 Convention 
is to protect the rights of stateless persons residing within the territory of a 
state and advance the proposition that no stateless person should be treated 
worse than any foreigner who possesses nationality.103  Chapter I defines 
statelessness and establishes the general obligations and principles of the 
Convention. 104  Chapters II through V define the juridical, employment, 
welfare, and administrative measures contracting states are obliged to take to 
protect stateless persons.105 
 The 1961 Convention provides specific guidance on preventing new 
cases of statelessness by enumerating safeguards that can be incorporated 
into national legislation.106  The title of the 1961 Convention (Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness) is a bit misleading.  The original title of the 
convention was “the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future 
Statelessness”107 and it was predicated on the idea that statelessness can only 
be avoided through international cooperation and robust national legislation 
that ensures no person “falls through the cracks.”108  
 The 1961 Convention creates four broad categories of protected 
stateless persons.109  Articles 1 through 4 articulate protections for children 
born in the state.  Articles 5 through 7 protect those who renounce or lose 
their nationality, conditioning any renunciation or withdrawal of citizenship 
upon acquisition of another nationality.110  Articles 8 and 9 protect against 
arbitrary and discriminatory deprivations of nationality, ensuring due 
process and equal protection when conferring and withdrawing citizenship.  
Finally, Article 10 addresses statelessness in the context of state succession, 
requiring contracting states to ensure that any state transfer of territory 
                                                 
102
  UNHCR, PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF STATELESS PERSONS: THE 1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO 
THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS 4 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5941c9.html 
[hereinafter PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF STATELESS PERSONS: THE 1954 CONVENTION]. 
103
  Id. 
104
 1954 Convention, supra note 13, ch. I.  
105
 See id. ch. II-V. 
106
  UNHCR, PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION ON THE 
REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS 1 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5937d9.html [hereinafter 
PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION]. 
107
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 42. 
108
  PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 2. 
109
  Id. at 4. 
110
  See generally 1961 Convention, supra note 15. 
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includes provisions “designed to secure that no person shall become stateless 
as a result of the transfer.”111 
 Both conventions call for the reduction of existing cases of 
statelessness through nationalization, but they do so indirectly and provide 
very little guidance on achieving this obligation.  This is, in part, due to the 
fact that no United Nations (“UN”) Treaty Monitoring Body monitors or 
provides general recommendations on either convention. 112   The 
Conventions themselves are also to blame.  Article 23 of the 1954 
Convention calls on contracting states to “facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of stateless persons.”113  However, the extent of this obligation 
is ambiguously limited by the phrase “as far as is possible.” 114   The 
obligation to facilitate naturalization is further weakened by the reservations 
and declarations of eleven states, disclaiming any obligation under this 
provision or accepting it only “so far as the law allows.”115   
 The 1961 Convention obligates contracting states to nationalize 
certain discrete classes of stateless persons.  Article 1 obligates contracting 
states to grant nationality to anyone born in its territory who would 
otherwise be stateless by operation of law, or upon application to the 
appropriate authority “in the manner prescribed by the national law,”116 and 
subject to certain conditions.117  Article 1 also requires that a stateless person 
whose father or mother were nationals of the state be granted nationality by 
“the manner prescribed by the national law.”118  Finally, Article 2 calls upon 
states to grant nationality to foundlings.119  
 Despite these obligations, the 1961 Convention does not provide 
adequate protection and guidance to effectively reduce statelessness.  First, 
in many Southeast Asian states ineffective birth registration systems make it 
                                                 
111
  Id. art. 10(1). 
112
  Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 12, at 273. 
113
  1954 Convention, supra note 13, art. 23(1). 
114
  Id. 
115
  These states include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Fiji, Kiribati, Lesotho, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the People’s Republic of 
China.  The most recent list of signatories and reservations to the 1954 Convention are available on the 
United Nations website.   Chapter V: Refugees & Stateless Persons, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~3&chapt
er=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en. 
116
  The 1961 Convention, supra note 15, art. 1, para. 1(b). 
117
  Id.  States are permitted to condition nationalization on:  1) residency requirements of up to five 
years, 2) that the applicant applies within the fixed window, not less than one year, 3) that the person has 
always been stateless, and 4) that the person has not been convicted of a crime against national security or 
imprisoned for a term of five or more years.  Id. art. 1, para. 2 (a-d). 
118
  Id. art. 1, para. 4. 
119
  Id. art. 2. 
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impossible to document a stateless person’s place of birth or parentage.120  
Article 1 does not obligate states to nationalize individuals who cannot 
prove, in the manner prescribed by national law, that they were born in the 
territory of the state, or that they are children of a national, and hence within 
the metes and bounds of the protections of Article 1 of the 1961 Convention.  
By relying on the procedures prescribed by national law, the 1961 
Convention leaves open the possibility that state parties may conform to the 
Convention, but nonetheless host a large population of stateless persons.121  
 Second, the 1961 Convention does not obligate contracting states to 
safeguard against arbitrary and discriminatory denials of citizenship, limiting 
its effectiveness to reduce statelessness.  While Article 9 ensures that a 
contracting state “may not deprive any person or group of persons of their 
nationality on racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds,” 122  the 
implementation of Article 1 is left to the “national law” of the state.123  
Nothing obligates or directs individual states to include safeguards against 
discriminatory laws, policies or administrative practices that result in 
statelessness, allowing states to continue to discriminate against 
minorities.124  
 Finally, the 1961 Convention is under-inclusive.  The provisions of 
the 1961 Convention fail to extend protections to four groups of stateless 
individuals.  The provisions of Article 1 necessarily exclude stateless 
individuals born to non-nationals who have missed the deadline for filing an 
application for citizenship, individuals who have been convicted of certain 
crimes, individuals who previously held a nationality, and individuals who 
have not resided in the state for the requisite period of time.125  These groups 
of stateless individuals are significant.  First, populations rendered stateless 
as a result of migration will not meet legal residency requirements. 126  
Second, the economic insecurity faced by statelessness drives many to 
commit crimes,127 which may disqualify them from relief under the 1961 
Convention.  Finally, many stateless persons have previously held 
citizenship, but were later rendered stateless.128   
                                                 
120
  See supra Part II.B.2. 
121
  A recent study in Thailand, for instance, linked the lack of accessible birth registration to 
statelessness.  NICOLA SHARP, supra note 34, at 25. 
122
  The 1961 Convention, supra note 15, art. 9. 
123
  See, e.g., id. art. 1(1). 
124
  See supra Part II.B.5.  For examples of legislative safeguards, see infra Part IV.A.1.a.  
125
  1961 Convention, supra note 15, art. 1, para. 2 (a)-(d). 
126
  See id. 
127
  See supra Part II.C.1; see also REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 29 n.189.  
128
  See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing automatic loss of citizenship); see also supra Part II.B.4 
(discussing loss of nationality following the dissolution of a state); Part II.B.5 (arbitrary revocation of 
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 In sum, the 1954 and 1961 Conventions provide a framework for 
protecting stateless individuals and preventing future instances of 
statelessness, but they fall short of providing guidance on a long-term 
solution for the 12 million people who are currently stateless.  A long-term 
solution for these individuals requires that the international community 
identify and enumerate the important legislative provisions and 
administrative protections that have proven indispensible in reducing 
existing cases of statelessness.  Part IV of this comment begins to construct 
such a framework for Southeast Asian states. 
B.  Domestic Legislation Can Successfully Reduce Instances of 
Statelessness  
 States can address statelessness using domestic legislation in a variety 
of ways.  Legislation can protect the rights of stateless persons,129 it can 
authorize the return of stateless persons to their state of habitual residence,130 
or it can naturalize stateless populations that habitually reside in a state.131  
This comment is concerned with reducing statelessness through 
naturalization, which can be accomplished in one of three ways.  Legislation 
can address individual cases of statelessness, it can target stateless 
populations in citizenship campaigns, or it can facilitate the naturalization of 
stateless persons.132   
 Individual cases of statelessness can be addressed through small 
changes in naturalization laws coupled with individual applications for 
naturalization or reinstatement of citizenship.133   As discussed above, 134 
thousands of women in Vietnam became stateless after they married 
foreigners and renounced their Vietnamese citizenship before they obtained 
citizenship in their spouse’s country. 135   Vietnam has recently passed 
                                                                                                                                                
citizenship); Part II.B.6 (loss of citizenship following the dissolution of a marriage); Part II.B.7 (withdrawal 
of citizenship). 
129
  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 17. 
130
  UNHCR, UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS: A STRATEGY NOTE 16, para. 59 (2010), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b960ae99.html [hereinafter UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS 
STATELESSNESS]. 
131
  Id. para 61. 
132
  REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 19-22. 
133
  Id. at 19. 
134
  See supra Part II.B.1. 
135
   GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 10.  
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legislation to address these stateless persons136 and they can now apply to 
restore their Vietnamese nationality on a case-by-case basis.137   
 Citizenship campaigns specifically target stateless populations. 138  
Legislation that naturalizes large populations en masse is a common way for 
this to occur.139  For example, after Indonesia gained its independence in 
1945, many ethnic Chinese migrants lacked Chinese citizenship and were 
unable to naturalize because they did not have the ability to document their 
longstanding ties to Indonesia. 140   After petitioning for a solution, a 
presidential decree in 2000 collectively naturalized 110,000 stateless 
individuals.141 
 Facilitated naturalization considers individual applications for 
naturalization, but the procedures and requirements for naturalization are 
less stringent for stateless individuals.142  For example, Vietnam has recently 
passed legislation ordering relaxed naturalization procedures and 
requirements for stateless individuals permanently residing in the country.143  
The law eliminated fees associated with the naturalization procedures and 
reduced the requirement for personal identification papers for these 
individuals.144 
 The problems posed by statelessness vary depending on a state’s 
political and social climate, and legislation to reduce statelessness will need 
to be tailored to the particularities of a situation.  Accordingly, this comment 
does not recommend any single solution for reducing statelessness.  Rather, 
the following section develops a framework that helps guide and evaluate 
legislation designed to reduce statelessness within Southeast Asia, relying on 
the experiences of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma.  
Because the literature on this topic is still evolving, this framework is 
necessarily incomplete.  Instead, the following sections outline the lessons 
that can be drawn from the emerging body of literature in hopes of 
                                                 
136
  Law on Vietnamese Nationality, Order No. 22 (2008), art. 23(f) [hereinafter Law on Vietnamese 
Nationality].  
137
  REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 20.  The Vietnamese government is developing 
a study of the beneficiary population and strategies for awareness raising and legal assistance. 
138
  Id.  
139
  It can also occur by decree or administrative order.  Id. 
140
  Id. at 21. 
141
  Id. at 20. 
142
  Id. at 21-22. 
143
  Law on Vietnamese Nationality, art. 8.  See also Government Decree No. 78 (2009) (Viet.) 
[hereinafter Government Decree No. 78] (describing and guiding the Law on Vietnamese Nationality  
art. 8(1) and clarifying that “permanently residing” means “stably residing in the Vietnamese territory since 
July 1, 1989”). 
144
  Government Decree No. 78 (Viet.).  
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encouraging additional study and debate over the essential elements of 
legislation designed to reduce statelessness through nationalization. 
IV.  THERE IS SUFFICIENT RESEARCH TO BEGIN DEVELOPING A 
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING LEGISLATION TO REDUCE EXISTING 
CASES OF STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
 International law has developed frameworks to protect existing 
stateless populations and prevent new cases of statelessness, but there is no 
framework to reduce statelessness.145  A successful framework will focus on 
specific provisions in national legislation.  Similar to the 1961 Convention, 
it will make recommendations for provisions in national legislation and 
measure legislation against these recommendations.  There have been 
relatively few attempts to construct such a framework based on the 
experiences of individual states and international experts.146  
 This framework is drawn from the experiences of Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma, as well as from the broad 
recommendations of international organizations.  It will make 
recommendations against which national legislation designed to reduce 
statelessness in Southeast Asia can be measured.  The purpose of the 
framework is to provide recommendations to parliamentarians, and to 
provide an analytic tool for legal scholars evaluating this type of legislation.  
A.  All Legislation to Reduce Statelessness Should Include Three 
Important Provisions, and Legislation to Facilitate the Naturalization 
of Stateless Should Include Five Additional Provisions 
 Nations can reduce stateless populations through naturalization by 
individual application, citizenship campaigns, or facilitated naturalization.147  
Regardless of the path chosen, the experiences of international organizations 
and individual states have identified three provisions in national legislation 
that bear heavily on the success of these pieces of legislation.  The following 
                                                 
145
  See supra Part III.  The 1961 Convention is the yardstick for measuring national legislation 
designed to prevent future cases of statelessness, while the 1954 Convention enumerates important 
protection measures needed to assure stateless persons basic human rights.  
146
  For something close to a framework, see UNHCR, STATELESSNESS: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
FOR PREVENTION, REDUCTION AND PROTECTION (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/49a271752.html 
[hereinafter STATELESSNESS: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK].  However, the framework is simply a series of 
questions.  Id. at 15-17.  See also HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19.  Unlike the UNHCR 
framework, which does not note the source of these suggestions, the latter framework seeks to take an 
empirical approach. 
147
  See supra Part III.D. 
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sections explore these provisions, paying particular attention to the 
experiences of Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia. 
1.  Three Important Recommendations Are Applicable to all Legislation 
Designed to Reduce Statelessness 
 Three factors have proven important to the success or failure of all 
types of legislation designed to reduce statelessness.  One of these factors is 
intrinsic to the legislation, while the other two highlight the importance of 
outside activities that states engage in before, during, and after the 
legislation is passed.   
a. Legislation should Safeguard Against Arbitrary Denial of Citizenship 
by Including Principles of Nondiscrimination, Ensuring the Right to 
Appeal, and Removing Reference to Ethnicity from Nationalization 
Laws 
 While the apparent causes of statelessness are technical and legal, 
discrimination on racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other grounds often 
plays a substantial role in causing statelessness.148  Reducing statelessness 
requires undoing the subtle force of discrimination.  A recent report by 
UNHCR reported on a thematic investigation into the effects of 
discrimination on the acquisition of nationality and concluded that 
nationalization laws and practices systematically deny nationality to 
minorities that are disfavored by a state.149   
 The situation of ethnic Rohingya in Burma demonstrates the way in 
which discrimination can stand in the way of efforts to reduce statelessness.  
The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic group descended from the northern 
Arakan region of Burma, 150  and they are forbidden from marrying or 
traveling without permission. 151  They are also often singled out by police 
for beatings and forced to perform labor.152   
 The Rohingya do not qualify for citizenship under Burma’s 1982 
Citizenship Law. 153   This law provides the Council of State with the 
authority to determine whether the Rohingya are among the ethnic groups 
                                                 
148
  UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS, supra note 130, at 25.  
149
  McDougall, supra note 53, at 15, paras. 44-45. 
150
  Burma [Myanmar]: Information on Rohingya Refugees, UNHCR REFWORLD (1999), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCIS,,MMR,,3ae6a6a41c,0.html (last visited May 1, 2012). 
151
  Mike Thompson, Burma’s Forgotten Rohingya, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2006). 
152
  Id. 
153
  Nurul Islam, Ronhingyas Should Not Be Treated in Hostile Way, WEEKLY BLITZ (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://www.weeklyblitz.net/576/rohingyas-should-not-be-treated-in-hostile-way (last visited May 1, 2012); 
see also Burma Citizenship Law, ch. 1, arts. 3, 4.  
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that may be granted nationality.154  This decision is made in conjunction 
with the Central Body, which has sweeping powers to determine citizenship 
policy.155  The Council of State has not designated the Rohingya as citizens 
under the law, 156  and consequently hundreds of thousands of Rohingya 
remain stateless.157 
 This framework proposes three legislative safeguards that ensure 
nondiscrimination and equal protection of stateless people when applying for 
nationalization.  First, legislation should ensure the right to appeal before an 
independent tribunal.  The right to effective appeal is a necessary component 
of legislation to safeguard against discrimination.158   Second, legislation 
should enshrine principles of equal protection and nondiscrimination within 
the body of the act to protect against discrimination by providing a guiding 
principle for those enacting the legislation.159  Finally, legislation should 
remove references to ethnicity from the state’s nationality laws.  
 An example from Indonesia illustrates the importance of this final 
safeguard.  Prior to 2000, at least 209,000 ethnic Chinese were stateless. 160  
In 2006, Indonesia passed legislation abolishing the distinction between 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups in their nationalization law. 161  
Abolishing this distinction allowed over 3,000 stateless ethnic Chinese who 
were previously ineligible for citizenship to nationalize.162 
b.  The State Should Engage in Awareness Campaigns that Target 
Stateless Persons 
 In order for legislation to be successful, stateless populations must be 
aware of the new legislation and understand the importance of obtaining 
citizenship.  Targeted awareness campaigns that aim to educate at-risk 
                                                 
154
  Burma Citizenship Law, ch. 1, art. 3.  
155
  Islam, supra note 153; see also Burma Citizenship Law, ch. 1, arts. 2(i), 35. 
156
  Islam, supra note 153.   
157
  Palash R. Ghosh, Burma: The Tragedy of the Rohingya People, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/277760/20120106/burma-myanmar-ronhingya-refugees-bangladesh-thaila 
nd-malaysia.htm (last visited May 1, 2012). 
158
  MAGDALENA SEPULVEDA ET AL., UNIVERSAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION: CASES 
AND COMMENTARIES 560 (2004), available at http://www.hrc.upeace.org/files/universal%20and%20region
al%20human%20rights%20protection.pdf.   
159
  These principles should prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination.  See, e.g., id. at 130-45 
(discussing the importance that these provisions played in protecting against discrimination in two cases 
from the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court).  
160
  SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 37.  This is the number of officially registered stateless 
ethnic Chinese; the total number is unknown.  Id. 
161
  Citizenship Law of the Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 12 (2006) [hereinafter Citizenship Law of 
Indonesia]; GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 18.  
162
  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 18.  
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populations about the importance of obtaining a nationality have proven to 
help guarantee the success of legislative reform.163  These campaigns remain 
important because stateless people often do not initially understand the 
importance of obtaining citizenship.164 
 UNHCR’s experience in Southeast Asia suggests that know-your-
rights campaigns encourage participation when stateless populations are 
otherwise reluctant to take part in the citizenship process.165  Television and 
radio broadcasts, informational posters, and leaflets have all proven to be 
effective means by which to raise awareness. 166   These measures are 
particularly effective when the government leverages partnerships with 
community leaders and civil service organizations to spread the word and 
encourage participation.167  As demonstrated in Cambodia, engaging local 
community leaders, religious leaders, and teachers can play a vital role in 
building trust and developing an understanding of programs in stateless 
communities. 168   The campaign in Cambodia was incredibly successful, 
registering over 90% of the country’s population, or 12.78 million people, 
between 2002 and 2008.169   
c. Legislators and Stakeholders Should Be Made Aware of the Situation 
Facing Stateless Persons before Drafting Legislation 
 UNHCR, through the experiences in its field offices, has found that 
awareness-raising and sensitivity sessions with legislators and other 
stakeholders help prepare these individuals to appropriately and adequately 
address the causes and consequences of statelessness.170   Trainings help 
legislators understand and appreciate the causes of statelessness, recognize 
the vulnerable situation in which these individuals find themselves, and 
appreciate the costs that statelessness imposes on society as a whole.171   
 
                                                 
163
  Id. at 20. 
164
  Id. 
165
  Id. at 21. 
166
  REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 16-20 (discussing successful approaches taken 
in Cambodia and the Philippines). 
167
  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 20, 27; 
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 15.  
168
  See supra Part II.B.2.  
169
  Cambodia: Impact of the Universal Birth Registration Campaign, PLAN INTERNATIONAL 
[hereinafter PLAN INTERNATIONAL], available at http://plan-international.org/birthregistration/resources/ 
country-case-studies/cambodia. 
170
  UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS, supra note 130, at 17-18, paras. 65-66.  
171
  UNHCR field offices have found that introducing legislators to the relevant international standards 
and information on statelessness helps to mobilize them.  Id. 
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2. Legislation to Facilitate the Naturalization of Stateless Persons 
Should Contain Five Important Provisions 
 According to field officers at the UNHCR, small-scale nationalization 
programs offer the best opportunities for facilitating a reduction in 
statelessness. 172   Although the 1961 Convention prescribes some of the 
provisions outlined below,173 this framework bases its recommendations on 
the experiences of individual states and experts who work to craft and 
evaluate legislation designed to reduce statelessness.   
a. Legislation Should Relax and Tailor Documentation Requirements for 
Stateless Persons When Applying for Naturalization 
 Most stateless individuals will have difficulty proving their birthplace, 
the amount of time they have been residing in a host state, and other 
common documentation requirements found in national laws.174  As a result 
of being stateless, they lack access to the formal administrative structures 
that create the paper trail necessary to document such requirements. 175  
Without reducing and tailoring documentation requirements for stateless 
individuals, facilitated nationalization legislation will be significantly less 
effective because stateless individuals, by virtue of being stateless, simply 
do not have access to the requisite documents.  
 Thailand’s multiple attempts to facilitate the naturalization of stateless 
ethnic minorities living in the north illustrate the importance of tailoring 
documentation requirements.  The problem began in 1956 when a large 
number of Hmong, Akha, Karen, Lahu, Lisu, and Mien ethnic minorities 
living in the mountainous regions of northern Thailand were excluded from 
the first national census—rendering them stateless. 176   The Royal Thai 
Government first attempted to address this problem by issuing temporary 
residency permits and granting leniency to various ethnic minority 
populations.177  However, this leniency proved to be a double-edged sword.  
                                                 
172
  Id. at 13 para. 45.  
173
  See, e.g., 1961 Convention, supra note 15, art. 4 (calling for reduced residency requirements for 
stateless persons habitually residing in a state where they were not born); see also 1954 Convention, supra 
note 13, art. 4. 
174
  See supra Part II.B.2; see also Milbrandt, supra note 18, at 92. 
175
  See supra Part II.B.2; see also Milbrandt, supra note 18, at 99. 
176
  Yindee Lertcharoenchok, Searching for Identity, STEP BY STEP (UN Inter-Agency Project 
Newsletter, Issue 5, Bangkok, Thai.), 2001, at 1, 4, available at http://www.no-trafficking.org/content/pdf/ 
issue5.pdf. 
177
  UNESCO, CITIZENSHIP MANUAL: CAPACITY BUILDING ON BIRTH REGISTRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 
IN THAILAND 48 (2008), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0016/001621/162153e.pdf 
[hereinafter UNESCO CITIZENSHIP MANUAL]. 
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Prior to a clarification to the nationalization law in 2000, it prevented 
individuals who were given leniency by the Thai government, as well as 
those given temporary residency permits and irregular immigrants, from 
naturalizing.178   
 This law was clarified in 2000, permitting stateless children born to 
ethnic minorities to nationalize if they are able to demonstrate that their 
parents entered Thailand prior to October 4, 1985 and that they were born in 
Thailand.179  However, stateless ethnic minorities in this region encounter 
social stigma, corruption, language barriers, and difficult administrative 
hurdles that prevent them from registering the birth of their children and 
documenting the date they entered Thailand. 180   These stringent 
documentation requirements ignore the fact that children born to parents 
who entered prior to this date cannot meet this high evidentiary burden 
because they lack the needed documents. 181   As a result, hundreds of 
thousands of villagers were without a nationality.182  Perhaps recognizing 
this deficiency, the Thai Government enacted legislation in 2008 to grant 
nationality to all children born in Thailand.183  
b. Legislation Should Reduce the Fees Associated with Nationalization 
and Relax Administrative Deadlines 
 Two large hurdles to attaining citizenship are the costs associated with 
the application process and the tight administrative deadlines that pervade 
most national legislation.184  Stateless individuals living in remote areas will 
find it difficult to make use of facilitated naturalization legislation unless 
legislators relax deadlines associated with the naturalization process.  This is 
because normal nationalization procedures require individuals to apply at 
government offices situated in urban centers, which require stateless persons 
                                                 
178
  Nationalization Act, No. 4 (2008), § 7 paras. 1-3 (Thai.) [hereinafter Thailand Nationalization Act] 
(as clarified by Regulation 2000 of the Nationality Act (Aug. 29, 2000)).  For a discussion of the 2000 
clarification, see THAILAND’S SUPPLEMENTARY CLARIFICATIONS TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 19-
20, § 3.1 (July 19-20, 2005), available at http://www.omct.org/files/2005/07/2982/wr_thailand_07_05.pdf 
(as part of Thailand’s presentation of its initial report under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights) [hereinafter THAILAND’S SUPPLEMENTARY CLARIFICATIONS].  
179
  Thailand Nationalization Act, § 7 para 1(2), § 7(bis) (as clarified by Regulation 2000 of the 
Nationality Act (Aug. 29, 2000)). 
180
  VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 16-26.  See also LEITER & BREYER, supra note 91, at 2.  
181
  See VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 17-21 (discussing the difficulties in obtaining a birth 
registration document and the hurdles presented by the absence of a database that is capable of confirming 
eligibility for citizenship).  
182
  Id. at 10. 
183
  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 12. 
184
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 32. 
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living in remote areas to travel long distances. 185  The process may require 
several trips or expensive overnight stays, which create serious impediments 
to naturalizing.  Likewise, unreasonable fees associated with nationalization 
applications pose an obstacle to reducing statelessness because stateless 
populations often live in situations of economic insecurity that prevent them 
from paying for services not vital to their survival.186   
 Reduced fees and relaxed administrative deadlines should also extend 
to the procedures necessary to obtain documentation needed to naturalize.  
The same obstacles outlined above stand in the way of obtaining birth 
registration and related documents, 187  and amending these procedural 
hurdles will enhance a program’s accessibility for stateless persons living in 
remote areas.  Awareness campaigns that emphasize the importance of 
obtaining citizenship can also play an important role in reducing the 
challenges posed by remote stateless populations by encouraging stateless 
populations to take advantage of relaxed administrative fees and 
deadlines.188 
 Cambodia’s massive birth registration campaign demonstrates the 
consequences of overlooking these two obstacles.  Despite targeting stateless 
populations 189  and registering 87% of the country’s population, 190  the 
registration campaign did not relax the administrative deadlines and fees 
associated with the registration process.  The long trips to the registration 
office and fees prevented many stateless people living in remote areas from 
registering. 191   This demonstrates that even well-planned and generally 
successful programs that target stateless populations can fail to reach the 
most vulnerable stateless populations if the registration fees and deadlines 
are not carefully considered during the planning stages.   
c.  Legislation Should Reduce Residency Requirements  
 In many cases, effective legislation to reduce statelessness requires 
reducing existing residency requirements.192  This is particularly true when 
                                                 
185
  SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 37 (discussing this problem in Cambodia); see also 
REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 14-15 (discussing this problem in Nepal). 
186
  As previously discussed, stateless individuals face severe economic insecurity, making fees a 
particularly difficult obstacle to overcome.  See supra Part II.C. 
187
  McDougall, supra note 53, at 9 para. 27. 
188
  See infra Part IV.B. 
189
  PLAN INTERNATIONAL, supra note 169.  
190
  Id. 
191
  SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 37 (discussing Cambodia). 
192
  See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL: THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND STATELESSNESS 11 (June 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e11d509
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stateless populations fail to meet statutory requirements for residency 
because they have recently migrated to the state and do not meet the 
statutory requirements.193  Effective legislation will consider the possibility 
that existing residency requirements, in addition to documentation 
requirements, are hurdles to effectively reducing statelessness.194  Carefully 
designed documentation requirements are important to effective 
legislation,195 but even well-crafted documentation requirements can fail to 
reduce statelessness if the targeted stateless populations have not resided in 
the state for the requisite period of time. 
 Laos is the only country that has a long-standing reduced residency 
requirement for stateless individuals in Southeast Asia.196  A stateless person 
of Lao race must reside within the state for three years and meet other 
statutory requirements before qualifying for citizenship.197  This is compared 
with five years for a person of Lao race who has citizenship elsewhere,198 
and ten years for those not of Lao race.199  This law has flaws, but it also 
exemplifies the type of legislation that can help reduce statelessness in the 
region.   
d. Legislation Should Naturalize Stateless Persons Born in the State 
 In some cases, a country will refuse to grant citizenship to a person 
even though they were born in the state. 200   Legislation that confers 
citizenship to individuals who were born in the state can bypass the 
difficulties inherent in meeting and documenting residency requirements by 
simply eliminating this burdensome documentation requirement.  This 
includes, for instance, ethnic Cambodians who were born in Vietnam and 
whose births were documented, but who nonetheless have not received 
Vietnamese citizenship.201   
 However, this recommendation is itself not a panacea for reducing 
statelessness.  Often documenting one’s place of birth can prove to be an 
                                                                                                                                                
2.html (recommending the reduction of residency requirements when using legislative measure to reduce 
statelessness).   
193
  VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 369 (making the same point about residency requirements for recent 
migrants in the context of the European Convention on Nationality). 
194
 UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS, supra note 130, at 13 para. 43.  
195
  See supra Part IV.2.A.  
196
  REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 22; see Law on Lao Nationality, No. 5 (2004) 
art. 15 (Laos) [hereinafter Law on Lao on Nationality]. 
197
  Law on Lao Nationality, art. 15.  
198
  Id.  
199
  Id. art. 14(10).  
200
  See supra Part II.B.1 (for a discussion of statelessness caused by jus sanguinis citizenship laws). 
201
  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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equally insurmountable obstacle because birth registry systems are so poorly 
designed and burdensome that many births go unregistered.202  Without birth 
certificates, stateless individuals are not able to take advantage of legislation 
that grants citizenship based on a person’s place of birth.203   
 Thailand provides a telling example of how onerous birth registration 
systems can result in a low birth registrations rates and statelessness.  In 
Thailand, hospitals are legally required to issue birth certificates. 204  
However, many stateless ethnic minorities living in northern Thailand do not 
give birth at hospitals.205  If a child is not born in a hospital, the law requires 
that the parents report the birth to the head of the village, who then must 
issue a birth report and forward it to the local registrar within fifteen days.206  
The local registrar is then required to issue a birth certificate and add the 
name of the child to the house register.207  Numerous factors complicate this 
process, including rampant discrimination and prejudice against ethnic 
minorities, corruption, and fear of imprisonment on the part of the stateless 
individuals.208  As a result, 40,000 births are unregistered every year in 
Thailand209 and these children are rendered stateless.210 
e. Legislation Should Waive Language and Knowledge Requirements 
 Language fluency requirements are another obstacle to acquiring 
citizenship.  Learning a new language is simply infeasible for many stateless 
individuals who, by virtue of being stateless, lack access to public education, 
or live in remote areas.211  In Vietnam, for instance, approximately 2,300 
stateless ethnic Cambodian who have resided there since the 1970s were 
                                                 
202
  See supra Part II.B.2’ see also UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS, supra note 130, at 
11 para. 33. 
203
  For instance, in Thailand, a child must prove that he or she was born in Thailand to take advantage 
of a 2000 clarification to the nationalization law that allows otherwise ineligible children to naturalize, 
assuming that their mother or father entered Thailand prior to October 4, 1985.  See THAILAND’S 
SUPPLEMENTARY CLARIFICATIONS , supra note 178.  
204
  Letter from Anucha Mokkawes, Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Interior of Thailand (May 22, 
2002), available at http://www.lac-ircthailand.org/document_sources/law/56/Letter%206984%20%2022 
May02.pdf.  
205
  Joy K. Park et al., A Global Crisis Writ Large: The Effect of Being “Stateless in Thailand” on 
Hill-Tribe Children, 10 SAN DIEGO INT’L.L.J. 495, 513 (2009). 
206
  UNESCO CITIZENSHIP MANUAL, supra note 177, at 12.  Note that the process requires substantial 
documentation of the parents’ legal status in Thailand, which is likely a separate impediment to birth 
registration by stateless parents.  
207
  Id.  
208
  Joy K. Park et al., supra note 205, at 525. 
209
  Nattha Keenapan, Ensuring the ‘First Right’ Online, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/thailand/reallives_14441.html.  
210
  VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 17.  
211
  See, e.g., supra Part II.C.1. 
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prevented from acquiring Vietnamese nationality, in part because the law 
required that they obtain a language proficiency certificate.212  This changed 
in 2008 when legislation removed, inter alia, language requirements for 
naturalization, resulting in a reduction in the stateless population.213 
B. Statelessness Determination Procedures Are Important for Legislation 
to Reduce Statelessness and There Is Agreement Among Academics 
and Practitioners on the Content of These Procedures 
 Statelessness determination procedures are the processes by which an 
individual is classified as stateless, and they are important whenever 
legislation provides specific accommodations for stateless persons.  An 
individual will need to first prove that he or she is stateless before 
benefitting from this legislation. 214   The form and substance of these 
procedures are incredibly important because stateless individuals will often 
have to prove that they are, indeed, stateless before benefiting from 
legislation to reduce statelessness. 
 A number of components—both procedural and substantive—define 
the parameters of these determining procedures.  The international 
community has discussed these components at length 215  and there is a 
growing consensus that adequate statelessness determination procedures will 
vary depending on the circumstances. 216   This discussion is particularly 
lively because the 1954 Convention requires that an individual first be 
designated as stateless before they are protected under the Convention.217  
While admitting that the procedures and substance of stateless determination 
procedures vary with the circumstances, international actors have identified 
important components of statelessness determination procedures common to 
all successful schemes.218   
                                                 
212
  GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 19.  
213
  Id.  
214
  Not all legislation designed to reduce statelessness will not first require adjudging an individual’s 
status as stateless.  When there is a large population of stateless with historic ties to the country, it is often 
better to design legislation to target all members of that group instead.  See STATELESSNESS: AN ANALYTIC 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 146, at 20.  For example, legislation may target “all ethnic minorities who do not 
possess Thai nationality” or “persons whom have renounced their citizenship upon marrying a foreigner.” 
 Id. 
215
  See, e.g., UNHCR, STATELESS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES AND THE STATUS OF STATELESS 
PERSONS (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9022762.html [hereinafter UNHCR 
STATELESS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES]. 
216
  For instance, the determination procedures for stateless populations that are largely migrants will 
vary from those who consider themselves in situ, or “in their own” country.  Id. at 2.  
217
  Id. at 1. 
218
  Id. at 2. 
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 Wide agreement among academics on the substance and form of these 
procedures makes it unnecessary to address each recommendation in depth 
here.  Instead, common components of these schemes are reproduced below 
for reference.  The purpose is to summarize the key ingredients involved in 
designing effective statelessness determination procedures and help readers 
identify when additional research may be warranted. 
 The following aspects of statelessness determination procedures have 
been identified as particularly important to their success: 
 
1) There is a formal procedure for determining statelessness 
status.219 
2) The determination is made by a central authority with the 
relevant knowledge and expertise to assess applications.220 
3) There are procedural safeguards that ensure a meaningful 
opportunity for review and appeal from decisions.221   
4) During the review process applicants are given a temporary stay 
of deportation.222 
5) Determinations are conducted on a case-by-case basis. 223   
6) Safeguards are established to ensure that the determination is fair, 
in keeping with international standards.224 
7) Applicants are provided with access to legal advice and qualified 
interpreters.225 
8) Written reasons for decisions are provided to applicants upon the 
completion of the determination.226 
9) In situations where refugee and stateless populations overlap, 
applicants are advised of their refugee rights.227 
                                                 
219
  Id. 
220
  Id. at 3; PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF STATELESS PERSONS: THE 1954 CONVENTION, supra note 
102, at 20; HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 20. 
221
  PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF STATELESS PERSONS: THE 1954 CONVENTION, supra note 102, at 6; 
UNCHR STATELESS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 215, at 4.  
222
  UNHCR STATELESS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 215, at 4.  
223
  Id. at 3.  However, membership in a particularly at-risk group may be considered prima facie 
evidence of statelessness.  Id. 
224
  PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF STATELESS PERSONS: THE 1954 CONVENTION, supra note 102, at 6; 
UNHCR STATELESS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 215, at 6. 
225
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 21; UNHCR STATELESS DETERMINATION 
PROCEDURES, supra note 215, at 4.  
226
  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 21, 33. 
227
  UNHCR STATELESS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 215, at 4.  
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10) Any administrative fees should be reasonable and not act as a 
deterrent to stateless persons seeking protection.228 
11) Both the applicant and the government share the burden of 
proving that the applicant is not considered a national by any state 
under the operation of law.229  After the applicant has demonstrated, 
based on all reasonably available evidence, that he or she is 
evidentially not a citizen of any state, the burden of proof shifts to the 
government to prove that the applicant has a nationality.230  
 
The standards above form a yardstick with which to measure the 
statelessness determination procedures of a state.  Any legislation that 
accommodates or otherwise singles out stateless individuals should 
incorporate many, if not all, of these components when creating procedures 
for determining whether than individual is stateless.  Together, these 
components form a robust canon of procedural due process rights.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 Stateless individuals continue to face severe economic, social, and 
political consequences because of their status.  This is particularly the case 
in Southeast Asia.  The causes of statelessness are diverse, and each presents 
particular problems that lend themselves to particular legislative solutions.   
 International law encourages states to pursue solutions to the problem 
of statelessness from various angles.  It pushes states to prevent future cases 
of statelessness and to protect existing stateless populations.  The 1954 
Convention creates a framework for protecting stateless populations in their 
country of habitual residence.  The 1961 Convention establishes a similar 
framework for legislation designed to preventing new cases of statelessness.  
 However, international law has yet to provide a framework that 
provides durable solutions for the 12 million individuals who are currently 
stateless.  This comment has begun to construct that framework, focusing on 
the lessons learned in Southeast Asian states.  Its goal was to begin forming 
a framework that is useful to legal scholars evaluating legislation in 
Southeast Asia and instructive to legislators crafting legislation to reduce 
existing cases of statelessness in the region.  
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